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PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH: ANSWERING THE UNANSWERED AND
RELATED QUESTIONS IN LANE V. FRANKS
By John E. Rumel
John E. Rumel is Associate Professor of Law at the University of Idaho College of Law. He received his J.D. from
the University of California Hastings College of Law, and his B.A. from the University of California, Santa Cruz.
The author teaches employment and labor law courses at the University of Idaho College of Law, focusing primarily
on public employee and education law topics. Prior to his current position, he was General Counsel for the Idaho
Education Association, a statewide teachers’ union. A more in-depth version of this article was published in the
Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal earlier this year and can be found under the citation John E. Rumel,
Public Employee Speech: Answering the Unanswered and Related Questions in Lane v. Franks, 34 HOFSTRA LAB.
EMP. L. J. 243 (2017).

I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Lane v. Franks[1] stands for
an important, albeit relatively unremarkable and uncontroversial, proposition in
the annals of public employee speech jurisprudence: Under the First Amendment,
public employees are protected from retaliation by public employers when the
employee, after having been subpoenaed to testify, provides truthful sworn
testimony on a matter of public concern, when testifying is not part of his or her
ordinary job responsibilities.[2] Indeed, to state Lane’s holding suggests its
validity. Thus, as far as Supreme Court decisions go, Lane was an easy case, with
Justice Sotomayor writing for a unanimous Court,[3] three Justices concurring,[4]
and a relatively brief and straightforward analysis.
Easy case or not, the Lane Court’s majority opinion is noteworthy for both how it
arrived at its holding, and what it did not decide. First, the opinion did not
challenge, but instead, gave a narrow reading to the Court’s 2006 decision in
Garcetti v. Ceballos[5] which held that, when a public employee speaks as part of
his or her official duties, the employee is speaking as an employee and not as a
citizen, and that, therefore, the speech is not protected from adverse employment
action under the First Amendment.[6] Second, the Lane opinion, in reaching a
result protecting public employee speech, resurrected and applied principles from
its seminal decision in Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School
District 205, Will County,[7] i.e., that speech by public employees on matters
related to their employment holds special value precisely because those employees
gain knowledge of matters that are of public concern through their employment—
which may not be possessed by non-employees—and that, as such, the public at
large benefits from constitutionally protecting that speech and not allowing
retaliation against those same employees.[8] Third, the opinion did not grapple
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with, and expressly left for another day, a more difficult doctrinal and policy
question than the one it decided, i.e., whether public employees will be protected
from public employer retaliation when they testify under the above circumstances
and in the same manner when testifying is part of their ordinary job
responsibilities.[9] Also, due to the narrowness of its Opinion, the Court did not
answer other related questions.[10]
This Article, drawing from and applying the principles relied upon by the Court in
reaching its decision in Lane, will address the unanswered and related questions
embedded in the Lane decision. As alluded to above, those principles include
recognizing public employees’ rights to enjoy job security when exercising their
First Amendment rights, as well as their important role in reporting on matters of
public concern and testifying truthfully under oath in judicial and other public
proceedings. These open questions, which were either expressly reserved inor
raised by the facts underlyingthe Court’s opinion in Lane and this Article’s
answers to those questions, are as follows:
 What is the significance, if any, of the Lane Court’s use on multiple occasions of the term
“ordinary job responsibilities” in contrast to the Garcetti Court’s reference to “official
duties” concerning limiting First Amendment protection for public employee speech?
Although not free from doubt, the Supreme Court’s use of the term “ordinary job
responsibilities” in Lane will likely narrow the scope of public employee speech excepted
from First Amendment protection.
 What result if a public employee, as part of his or her ordinary job responsibilities and
pursuant to a subpoena or as a representative of his or her employer, provides truthful
sworn testimony about a matter of public concern? As in Lane, and assuming Garcetti
continues to set a threshold limit on the free speech rights of public employees, a public
employee’s testimony under these circumstances should be protected under the First
Amendment, subject to Pickering balancing.
 What result if a public employee testifies as part of those same ordinary job
responsibilities about the same subject matter, but does so voluntarily? The answer
should be no different, i.e., the employee’s speech should be protected under the First
Amendment, but again subject to Pickering balancing.
 What result if the content of a public employee’s sworn truthful testimony does not
relate to a matter of public concern? Although a close question, given the importance of
promoting truth-seeking in judicial and administrative proceedings, public employees
should be protected from retaliation by their employers even when the content of their
testimony does not involve a matter of public concern.
 What result if a public employee’s testimony is false or erroneous? Generally speaking,
the public employee should not be protected from adverse employment action under the
First Amendment.
 What result if, during testimony, the public employee unnecessarily discloses sensitive,
confidential or privileged information? The public employee should not be protected from
adverse employment action based on his or her testimony.
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 What result if a public employee admits to wrongdoing while testifying? As long as the
public employee is afforded progressive discipline and due process, the wrongdoing has a
nexus to the employee’s job responsibilities, and the employee has not been granted
immunity in exchange for his or her testimony, the public employee’s admission of
wrongdoing while testifying will constitute cause for adverse employment action against
the employee.

Part II of this Article will discuss the Lane case in detail, summarizing the facts,
lower court proceedings and the Supreme Court’s decision, including both the
majority and concurring opinions. Part III will discuss and answer in detail the
above-listed unanswered and related questions stemming from Lane, reaching
both public employer-favoring and public employee-favoring results guided by the
principles that drove the Court’s decision in Lane. Part IV will conclude that
reliance on the legal and policy principles emphasized by the Court in Lane will
further the values underlying the protection of public employee speech in the
sworn testimony context.
II. LANE V. FRANKS
A.

The Facts and Lower Court Proceedings

Edward Lane was a public employee hired by Central Alabama Community College
(“CACC”) on probationary status to serve as its Director of Community Intensive
Training for Youth (“CITY”), a program for underprivileged youth.[11] As Director,
Lane’s job responsibilities included managing the day-to-day operation of the CITY
program, hiring and firing employees, and overseeing the program’s finances.[12]
Like many public agencies, the CITY program faced difficult financial times.[13]
In reviewing the program’s finances, Lane learned that Suzanne Schmitz, an
Alabama State Representative employed by the program, had not been reporting
to her assigned CITY office.[14] Lane discussed the matter with Schmitz but was
unsuccessful in getting her to change this behavior.[15] When Lane took the matter
to CACC’s president and its attorney, they warned Lane that firing Schmitz could
have negative consequences for both him and CACC[16] presumably because of
Schmitz’s status as a state representative.
These warnings notwithstanding, Lane went back to Schmitz and instructed her to
show up at her assigned office in Huntsville to perform her job as a counselor.[17]
When Schmitz refused, Lane fired her.[18] Schmitz then told a co-worker that she
would “get [Lane] back for firing her,”[19] and that, if Lane ever appeared before
the state legislature to request money for the CITY program, “she would tell him,
‘[y]ou’re fired.’”[20]
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Schmitz’s termination led to several investigations into her conduct while she was
employed with the CITY program, including one by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.[21] Lane eventually testified before a grand jury concerning his
reasons for firing Schmitz.[22] A little over a year later, the grand jury indicted
Schmitz on multiple counts of mail fraud and theft relating to her having allegedly
and improperly taken money from a program receiving federal funds.[23] The
indictment alleged that Schmitz had received over $175,000 in federal funds even
though she performed little to no work for the CITY program and further alleged
that Schmitz had submitted false time sheets concerning the amount of hours she
worked and the nature of the services she rendered.[24]
Schmitz’s federal court trial commenced approximately six months after the
indictment.[25] Having been subpoenaed, Lane testified at trial about the events
leading up to his decision to fire Schmitz.[26] The jury was unable to reach a
verdict, thereby causing the prosecutors to retry Schmitz.[27] Lane testified at
Schmitz’s retrial.[28] This time, the jury convicted Schmitz on all but one of the
multiple counts concerning her having defrauded and stolen money from a
program receiving federal funds.[29] The district court sentenced Schmitz to thirty
months in prison, and ordered her to forfeit and make full restitution of the money
fraudulently stolen from the CITY program.[30]
Meanwhile, the CITY program continued to experience budgetary difficulties.[31]
As a result, Lane recommended to CACC’s recently-hired president Steve Franks
that he (Franks) lay off a number of CITY employees.[32] Franks did so,
terminating twenty-nine CITY probationary employees, including Lane.[33]
Because of ambiguity in the employees’ probationary status, Franks quickly
rescinded all but two of the twenty-nine employees’ terminations.[34] Franks,
however, did not reinstate Lane, based on Franks’ stated belief that, because Lane
was a director of the CITY program and not simply an employee, he could be
treated differently than the other probationary employees.[35] Not long thereafter,
CACC eliminated the CITY program and terminated its remaining employees.[36]
Lane sued Franks, in both his individual and official capacities, in federal
court.[37] Lane alleged that Franks had violated his federal civil and constitutional
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First Amendment by terminating Lane in
retaliation for having testified against Schmitz.[38] “Lane sought damages from
Franks in his individual capacity and sought equitable relief, including
reinstatement, from Franks in his official capacity.”[39]
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The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Franks[40] and the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed.[41] The Supreme Court granted certiorari[42] to resolve
the split of opinions in the courts of appeals[43] on the question of “whether public
employees may be firedor suffer other adverse employment consequencesfor
providing truthful subpoenaed testimony outside the course of their ordinary job
responsibilities.”[44]
B.

The Supreme Court’s Decision
The Outcome/Result

In a unanimous opinion, with three Justices concurring, the Supreme Court
reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s decision as to Lane’s section 1983 and First
Amendment claims against Franks’ successor, Burrow, in her official capacity;
affirmed the decision on qualified immunity grounds as to those same claims
against Franks in his individual capacity; and remanded the case to the lower
courts for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s opinion.[45]
Guiding and Governing Principles

Writing for the Court, Justice Sotomayor foreshadowed the outcome of the
decision with the opening words of the opinion.[46] She stated “Almost [fifty]
years ago, this Court declared that citizens do not surrender their First
Amendment rights by accepting public employment.”[47] Citing to its seminal
decision in Pickering v. Board of Education,[48] the Court pointed out that, in the
context of public employee speech, a “careful balance” is needed “‘between the
interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency
of the public services it performs through its employees.’”[49] Similar to
Pickering, the Lane Court struck the balance in favor of Lane and other public
employees, holding that the “the First Amendment . . . protects a public employee
who provided truthful sworn testimony, compelled by subpoena, outside the
course of his ordinary job responsibilities.”[50]
By leading with and emphasizing the compatibility of public employee speech with
public employment and the Pickering balancing test, the Court resurrected first
principles that had been stated, but given short shrift, in its two previous major
public employee speech casesConnick v. Myers,[51] and Garcetti, which had set
up threshold barriers to protecting public employees and their speech from
retaliation by public employers.[52] Thus, in Connick, a case involving a
questionnaire circulated internally by a disgruntled staff attorney in a prosecutor’s
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office, the Court clarified its decision in Pickering by holding that no balancing of
the employee’s interest in speech with the public employer’s interest in efficiently
providing its public services was necessary, unless the employee first
demonstrated that the speech involved a matter of public concern.[53] More
recently in Garcetti, where a mid-level prosecutor prepared an internal
memorandum as part of his official duties, which described purported misconduct
by a law enforcement officer in swearing out a warrant affidavit and recommending
dismissal of the case, [54] the Court determined that the prosecutor was speaking
as an employee, not as a citizen and, as such, his speech was not protected under
the First Amendment.[55]
Having set the tone for what was to follow, the Court in Lane reiterated the twostep analytical framework for evaluating whether public employee speech is
constitutionally protected, which it had first enunciated in Garcetti:
The first requires determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of
public concern. If the answer is no, the employee has no First Amendment cause of action
based on his or her employer’s reaction to the speech. If the answer is yes, then the
possibility of a First Amendment claim arises. The question becomes whether the
relevant government entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee
differently from any other member of the general public.[56]

The Court next restated the distinction between citizen speech and employee
speech that drove its decision in Garcetti, explaining that although “speech as a
citizen may trigger protection . . . ‘when public employees make statements
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer discipline.’”[57] At this juncture, the Court again
stated the narrow question before it, pointing out both what it was deciding and
what it was not:
It is undisputed that Lane’s ordinary job responsibilities did not include testifying at court
proceedings . . . For that reason, Lane asked the Court to decide only whether truthful
sworn testimony that is not part of an employee’s ordinary job responsibilities is citizen
speech on a matter of public concern. We accordingly need not address in this case
whether truthful sworn testimony would constitute citizen speech under Garcetti when
given as part of a public employee’s ordinary job duties, and express no opinion on that
matter today.[58]
The Legal Standard Applied

The Court subdivided the first step of the two-step inquiry, analyzing first whether
Lane’s testimony at Schmitz’s trial constituted speech as a citizen, as opposed to
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speech as an employee, and second, whether Lane’s testimony involved a matter
of public concern.[59] As to each issue, the Court did not have any difficulty ruling
in Lane’s favor.
a. The Citizen Speech v. Employee Speech Issue

As to the citizen speech issue, the Supreme Court started with its conclusion,
holding that “[t]ruthful testimony under oath by a public employee outside the
scope of his ordinary job duties is speech as a citizen for First Amendment
purposes . . . even when the testimony relates to his public employment or
concerns information learned during that employment.”[60] In so holding, the
Court disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit and grounded its conclusion on two
separate bases.[61]
First, the Court took the Eleventh Circuit to task for minimizing “the nature of
sworn judicial statements,” and for “ignor[ing] the obligation borne by all
witnesses testifying under oath.”[62] On this point, the Court opined as follows:
Sworn testimony in judicial proceedings is a quintessential example of speech as a citizen
for a simple reason: Anyone who testifies in court bears an obligation, to the court and
society at large, to tell the truth. When the person testifying is a public employee, he may
bear separate obligations to his employerfor example, an obligation not to show up to
court dressed in an unprofessional manner. But any such obligations as an employee are
distinct and independent from the obligation, as a citizen, to speak the truth. That
independent obligation renders sworn testimony speech as a citizen and sets it apart from
speech made purely in the capacity of an employee.[63]

Second, the Court disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that, because
Lane’s testimony was based upon information learned during the course of his
employment with, or related to his position at CACC and CITY, Garcetti required
that Lane’s speech be treated as employee, rather than citizen, speech.[64] On this
point, the Court distinguished Garcetti by noting that the prosecutor in that case
had prepared the internal memorandum regarding law enforcement misconduct
for his supervisors recommending dismissal of a particular case as part of his
“official responsibilities,” (i.e., as part of the “tasks he was paid to perform” as a
government employee).[65] In contrast, the Court characterized Lane’s testimony
as “speech that simply relates to public employment or concerns information
learned in the course of public employment.”[66] Although the Lane Court stated
that “Garcetti said nothing about speech” of the latter kind,[67] it immediately
reinforced its holding by noting that “[t]he Garcetti Court made explicit that its
holding did not turn on the fact that the memo at issue ‘concerned the subject
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matter of [the prosecutor’s] employment,’ because ‘[t]he First Amendment
protects some expressions related to the speaker’s job.’”[68]
The Court, having distinguished and clarified its holding in Garcetti, held as to the
“relatedness/official duties” issue:
[T]he mere fact that a citizen’s speech concerns information acquired by virtue of his
public employment, does not transform that speech into employeerather than
citizenspeech. The critical question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is
itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns
those duties.[69]

The Courtagain, harkening back to Pickering and emphasizing a rationale for
protecting public employee speech based on information garnered in the course of
public employment which had been minimized in Garcettifurther bolstered its
holding as follows:
It bears emphasis that our precedents dating back to Pickering have recognized that
speech by public employees on subject matter related to their employment holds special
value precisely because those employees gain knowledge of matters of public concern
through their employment. In Pickering, for example, the Court observed that “[t]eachers
are . . . the members of the community most likely to have informed and definite opinions
as to how funds allotted to the operation of the schools should be spent. Accordingly, it
is essential that they be able to speak out freely without fear of retaliatory dismissal.”[70]

Further supporting its decision concerning the breadth of Garcetti’s holding and
the importance of public employee speech in corruption cases like Lane, the Court
noted the anomaly that would occur if the speech often necessary to prosecute
those cases, i.e., speech learned at work, could not “form the basis for a First
Amendment retaliation claim.”[71] The Court further noted the “impossible
position” a public employee would be in if forced to choose between testifying
truthfully about corruption witnessed in the workplace, and avoiding loss of his or
her job due to possible retaliation.[72] The Court concluded that the Eleventh
Circuit erred under the first subdivision of the first step in the analysis by failing
to recognize that “Lane’s sworn testimony [was] speech as a citizen.”[73]
b. The Matter of Public Concern Issue

The Court then turned to the second subdivision of the first step, i.e., the issue of
whether “Lane’s testimony is also speech on a matter of public concern.”[74] Given
the nature of the case in which Lane testified, the Court had little trouble resolving
the public concern issue in Lane’s favor.[75]
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The Court first laid out the well-settled standard for determining whether speech
was on a matter of public concern, i.e., whether the speech could be “fairly
considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community, or when it is [on] a subject of legitimate news interest,”[76] the
resolution of which inquiry turned on the “‘content, form and context’ of the
speech.”[77]
As to the content of Lane’s testimony, the Court easily concluded that Lane’s
testimony about “corruption in a public program and misuse of state
fundsobviously involves a matter of significant public concern.”[78] As to the
form and context of Lane’s speech, the Court stated that the fact that the speech
occurred as “sworn testimony in a judicial proceeding,” bolstered its conclusion
that the speech involved a matter of public concern.[79] Specifically, the Court
opined that “‘[u]nlike speech in other contexts, testimony under oath has the
formality and gravity necessary to remind the witness that his or her statements
will be the basis for official governmental action, action that often affects the rights
and liberties of others.’”[80] Based on this reasoning, the Court held that “Lane’s
truthful sworn testimony at Schmitz’[s] criminal trials [constituted] speech . . . on
a matter of public concern.”[81]
c. Pickering Balancing

If the Court had little difficulty resolving the public concern issue, it had the same
or less level of trouble disposing of the second step inquiry in public employee
cases—the Pickering balancing issue.[82]
The Court started its analysis of the second step by reiterating the governing legal
standard which it had stated or alluded to at the outset of its opinion.[83] Thus,
the Court repeated that, “[u]nder Pickering, if an employee speaks as a citizen on
a matter of public concern, the next question is whether the government had ‘an
adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member
of the public’ based on the government’s needs [as] an employer.”[84] The Court
then delineated the government’s interest under Pickering, pointing out that
“government employers often have legitimate interest[s] in the effective and
efficient fulfillment of [their] responsibilities to the public, including promot[ing]
efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties, and maintain[ing] proper
discipline in public service.”[85]
Applying these standards, the Court found the government employer’s proof
completely wanting, thus concluding that the Eleventh Circuit had erred:
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[T]he employer’s side of the Pickering scale is entirely empty: Respondents do not assert,
and cannot demonstrate, any government interest that tips the balance in their favor.
There is no evidence, for example that Lane’s testimony at Schmitz’[s] trials was false or
erroneous or that Lane unnecessarily disclosed any sensitive, confidential, or privileged
information while testifying. In these circumstances, we conclude that Lane’s speech is
entitled to protection under the First Amendment.[86]
d. Conclusion

As discussed previously, the Court, having ruled that Lane’s testimony constituted
protected speech as a citizen under the First Amendment, also found and
concluded that Franks was entitled to qualified immunity on Lane’s claims against
him in his individual capacity, and remanded the case for further proceedings so
that the lower courts could address Lane’s claims against Franks’ successor
Burrow.[87]
The Concurring Opinion

Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Scalia and Alito, wrote a brief concurring
opinion.[88] The concurring justices noted that the “discrete question” presented
for decision by the Court was “whether a public employee speaks ‘as a citizen on a
matter of public concern,’ when the employee gives ‘[t]ruthful testimony under
oath . . . outside the scope of his ordinary job duties.’”[89] According to the
concurring opinion:
Answering that question requires little more than a straightforward application of
Garcetti. . . .The petitioner in this case did not speak “pursuant to” his ordinary job duties
because his responsibilities did not include testifying in court proceedings . . . and no
party has suggested that he was subpoenaed as a representative of his employer. Because
petitioner did not testify to “fulfil[l] a [work] responsibility,” . . . he spoke “as a citizen,”
not as an employee.[90]

Like the majority opinion, the concurring justices delineated the questions that
were not beforeand, therefore, not decided bythe Court, stating as follows:
We . . . have no occasion to address the quite different question whether a public employee
speaks “as a citizen” when he testifies in the course of his ordinary job responsibilities.
For some public employees—such as police officers, crime scene technicians, and
laboratory analysts—testifying is a routine and critical part of their employment duties.
Others may be called to testify in the context of particular litigation as the designated
representatives of their employers. The Court properly leaves the constitutional questions
raised by these scenarios for another day.[91]
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III. THE UNANSWERED (AND RELATED) QUESTIONS
AFTER LANE V. FRANKS
A.

The Significance, if any, of the Lane Court’s Use of the Term
“Ordinary Job Responsibilities,” Rather than the Garcetti Court’s
“Official Duties” Terminology

The first question raised by the Lane opinion is a textual one. It stems from the
Supreme Court’s shift from the term “official duties,” used in Garcetti to the term
“ordinary job responsibilities,” used in Lane to define the exception to First
Amendment protection for speech, to use Garcetti’s phrase, “ow[ing] its existence
to a public employee’s professional responsibilities.”[92]
In Garcetti, the Court majority used the term “official duties” to demarcate speech
by public employees that would go unprotected under the First Amendment, and
never once used the term “ordinary job responsibilities.”[93] In contrast, the Lane
majority and concurrence used the term “ordinary” as it pertained to job
responsibilities or duties nine times.[94] Neither the Lane majority nor
concurrence commented on the change in verbiage, let alone explained whether
the Court’s shift in language was intended as a shift in meaning.
It is, of course, possible that the Court’s use of the term “ordinary job
responsibilities” in Lane was inadvertent and not intended to change the line
drawn between protected and unprotected public employee speech by the Garcetti
Court’s use of the term “official duties.”[95] This view would be supported by the
similarity of the two terms and the fact that neither the Lane majority nor
concurrence commented upon the change in language. However, this
interpretation would run contrary to the axiom that a court’s change in language
concerning the governing legal standard signals an intent to change the meaning
of the legal standard.[96]
More likely, in shifting from the term “official duties” in Garcetti to “ordinary job
responsibilities” in Lane, the Court intended to say something about the line
demarcating protected and unprotected speech as it pertains to the employee’s role
in the workplace. Certainly, a strong argument can be made that the Court’s “use
of the adjective ‘ordinary’. . . could signal a narrowing of the realm of employee
speech left unprotected by Garcetti.”[97] However, focusing more on the Eleventh
Circuit decision it was reversing, the Lane Court may have used the term
“ordinary” less to signal a narrowing in meaning from what it had said in Garcetti,
and more to clarify for lower courts that Garcetti’s “official duties” requirement
should be read narrowly.[98] The Third Circuit, without resolving the issue, has
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stated without explanation that “Lane may broaden Garcetti’s holding by
including ‘ordinary’ as a modifier to the scope of an employee’s job duties”[99]
although that judicial assertion seems clearly wrong and could only possibly be
correct if the Supreme Court intended to broaden Garcetti by replacing, rather
than modifying, the term “official” with the term “ordinary.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court did not define or comment upon its use of the term
“ordinary job responsibilities” in Lane. Likewise, the Court did not address the
meaning of the new term in its next public employee speech case.[100] Lower
courts have been able to avoid the definitional issue by concluding that the speech
in the case before them fell within the meaning of both the Garcetti and Lane
terminology, or instead, ruled in favor of a public official on qualified immunity
grounds.[101] For these reasons, there is no definitive judicial guidance on the
subject.
Because the Supreme Court gave no explanation for its shift in language from
Garcetti’s “official duties” standard to Lane’s “ordinary job responsibilities” test,
accurately predicting the threshold standard that the Court will usea standard
based on the roles and duties of the affected public employeeto limit public
employee speech rights, is extremely problematic. However, several guiding
principles may be articulated. First, to the extent that the Court continues to limit
those speech rights with a Garcetti-type barrier, it is likely that the Court will adopt
one standard. Given that the Court predicated its decision in Garcetti on a bright
line distinction between unprotected public employee speech and protected citizen
speech, it would make little sense to draw that line based on the official duties of
the employee in cases when the employee is not testifying under oath, and on the
ordinary job responsibilities of that same public employee when judicial or
administrative testimony is involved. Second, based on the general principle that
exceptions to First Amendment protections should be narrowly construed,[102]
and on the substantive principle initially advanced in Pickering and resurrected in
Lane that public employees serve an important role as a source of information
about the operation of public entities, the Court should adopt and apply the
phraseology that make the least incursion on public employee speech rights.
Third, based on a textual reading of the two phrases, Lane’s “ordinary job
responsibilities”and particularly the term “ordinary”formulation leaves less
public employee speech unprotected than Garcetti’s “official duties” formulation.
For these reasons, as long as the Court continues to carve out an exception to public
employee First Amendment protection premised on the scope of the employee’s

FALL 2017

ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT

15

job duties, it should apply Lane’s narrower ordinary job responsibilities standard
to public employee speech cases.
B.

Testimony as Part of a Public Employee’s Ordinary Job
Responsibilities/Official Duties

As of this writing, there have not been any post-Lane cases discussing the question
expressly left open by both the majority and concurrence in Lane, i.e., whether a
public employee speaks as a citizenand cannot be retaliated against by a public
employerwhen he or she provides truthful sworn testimony as part of his or her
ordinary job responsibilities[103] or, as specifically anticipated by the
concurrence, as a result of being designated as a witness by the employer under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6).[104] In other words, no post-Lane cases
have addressed the issue of whether truthful testimony by public employees which
occurs as a result of their ordinary job responsibilities constitutes an exception to
Garcetti’s official duties threshold limitation.[105]
However, several cases decided prior to Lane, but after Garcetti, reached divergent
results. Indeed, prior to the Supreme Court leaving the “ordinary job
responsibilities/truthful testimony” question unanswered in Lane, the appellate
courts were essentially evenly split on the issue. Thus, the Third Circuit in Reilly v.
Atlantic City,[106] had held “that truthful testimony in court” by a public employee
“constituted citizen speech” protected under the First Amendment “not foreclosed
by the ‘official duties’ doctrine enunciated in Garcetti.”[107] In contrast, the Ninth
Circuit in Huppert v. City of Pittsburg,[108] and the Seventh Circuit in Tamayo
v. Blagojevich,[109] both held that testimony by a public employee given as part
of their official duties was employee, not citizen, speech and, therefore, not
protected under Garcetti.[110]
Based largely on the Supreme Court’s decision in Lane and on its reliance on
Pickering, the Supreme Court and post-Lane lower courts should carve out an
exception to Garcetti’s threshold limitation by protecting truthful testimony
given as part of a public employee’s ordinary job responsibilities. Several reasons
support this proposed outcome.
First, the added factor of sworn testimony in judicial or administrative proceedings
meaningfully and substantively distinguishes the question left unanswered in Lane
from the public employee speech in Garcettian unsworn internal
memorandumand indeed, all other public employee speech cases not involving
testimony before a tribunal. Sworn testimony is different. As quoted previously,
but worth repeating, the Lane Court emphasized:
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Sworn testimony in judicial proceedings is a quintessential example of speech as a citizen
for a simple reason: Anyone who testifies in court bears an obligation, to the court and
society at large, to tell the truth. When the person testifying is a public employee, he may
bear separate obligations to his employer. . . . But any such obligations as an employee
are distinct and independent from the obligation, as a citizen, to speak the truth. That
independent obligation renders sworn testimony speech as a citizen and sets it apart from
speech made purely in the capacity of an employee.[111]

Related, the duty to provide truthful sworn testimony raises the quasi-Catch22/Hobson’s choice dilemma for public employees pointed out by the Court in
Lane.[112] Thus, as Justice Sotomayor wrote for the Court in Lane, a rule
conclud[ing] that the very kind of speech necessary to prosecute corruption by public
officials -- speech by public employees regarding information learned through their
employment may never form the basis of a First Amendment retaliation claim. . . . Such a
rule would place public employees who witness corruption in an impossible position, torn
between the obligation to testify truthfully and the desire to avoid retaliation and keep
their jobs.[113]

This dilemma will exist whether a public employee is testifying as part of his or her
ordinary job responsibilities or, specifically, as a Rule 30(b)(6) designee of his
employer or not.[114] Moreover, whichever choice a public employee makes will
be detrimental to both the employee and society at large. If the employee testifies
falsely or less than candidly, the employee may face perjury charges or, at the very
least, the opprobrium and scorn of the court and anyone who observes or learns of
his or her testimony. Likewise, as pointed out by the Court in Lane and Pickering,
false testimony will deprive society (and the judge, jury and parties before the
court) of valuable, accurate information from a public employee who may be
ideally or uniquely suited to provide the testimony. If, however, the employee
testifies truthfully, without the security of First Amendment protection, he or she
runs the risk of being retaliated against by his employer. Although society (and the
above-mentioned stakeholders) will initially receive the benefit of the Pickeringpromoted information, society (and future judicial or administrative tribunal
stakeholders) will ultimately be disserved as public employees chill their own
speech and/or censor themselves because of the very real specter of adverse
employment consequences.
In addition, much like in Lane, the individual speaker’s and society’s interest in
truthful sworn testimony given by public employees as part of their ordinary job
responsibilities will seldom be outweighed by public employers’ interest in
managerial efficiency or control under Pickering. In what should be relatively rare
instances, the importance of truthful testimony and its role in maintaining the
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integrity of the judicial or administrative process and promoting public awareness
about matters of public concern may be sufficiently counterbalanced by a public
employer’s (and society’s) legitimate interest in maintaining confidentiality
concerning an ongoing investigation by law enforcement,[115] or a matter of
national security.[116] And, in those relatively rare circumstances, the court itself
will have the ability to protect the public employer’s interest by determining, prior
to the testimony, whether the evidence is admissible or, specific to the issue before
it, determining whether the government’s interest in confidentiality outweighs the
public employee’s interest as a citizen, and society’s interest in having the
employee testify truthfully about a matter of public concern.[117] Thus, to borrow
from Lane, when a public employee testifies truthfully as part of his or her ordinary
job responsibilities, “the employer’s side of the Pickering scale” will almost always
be “entirely empty.”[118]
In conclusion, courts should carve out an exception to Garcettitempered only
rarely by Pickering balancingby protecting public employees from retaliation
and adverse employment consequences when they testify truthfully about a matter
of public concern as part of their ordinary job responsibilities.
C.

Voluntary/Non-Compelled Testimony

As with the “ordinary job responsibilities/truthful sworn testimony” question, few,
if any, post-Lane cases have discussed whether voluntary testimony should enjoy
the same First Amendment protection as compelled, i.e., subpoenaed,
testimony.[119] As with a number of the Lane’s unanswered questions, guidance
can be found in pre-Lane authorities.
Protection of Voluntary Testimony as a Threshold Matter

Pre-Lane, several courts in the Second Circuit concluded that voluntary testimony
should receive constitutional protection, succinctly stating that “[v]oluntarily
appearing as a witness in a public proceeding or a lawsuit is a kind of speech that
is protected by the First Amendment.”[120] In addition, the Third Circuit,
presaging the Lane Court’s view that the need to protect uninhibited testimony
and, in turn, the integrity of the judicial process is paramount, held that witnesses
who appear voluntarily to testify in judicial proceedings must be free from
employer retaliation under the First Amendment.[121] Only one panel in the
Second Circuit, in an unpublished decision, held prior to Lane that voluntary
testimony is not protected under the First Amendment.[122]
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In sum, the vast majority of federal circuit court decisions pre-Lane agreed that,
as a threshold matter, truthful voluntary testimony on a matter of public concern
should be protected under the First Amendment.
Voluntary Testimony and Pickering Balancing

As noted above, although essentially all pre-Lane courts have concluded, as a
threshold matter, that voluntary sworn testimony is entitled to First Amendment
protection, those same courts have also evaluated, consistent with Lane, the
several interests raised by the Pickering-balancing test.[123] Interestingly, those
courts reached divergent results. Thus, in Green, the Third Circuit, discounting
the public’s interest in truthful testimony when voluntary, not subpoenaed,
testimony is involved and focusing on the “potential disruptiveness of the speech”
– which involved testimony in favor of a member of a crime family member – on
law enforcement departmental morale, held that the “risk of injury to the . . . Police
Department outweighs the public interest favoring Green’s speech.”[124]
However, in Kinney v. Weaver, the Fifth Circuit came to the opposite conclusion,
holding – in a case involving testimony by two police officers adverse to their
employer’s interest in an excessive force case – that the public’s interest in expert
testimony about police misconduct and the existence of a factual dispute regarding
whether police department officials could reasonably predict workplace disruption
due to the officers’ testimony precluded summary judgment in favor of the public
officials under Pickering.[125]
Based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Lane, there can be little legitimate
dispute that the majority of pre-Lane courts got it right: whether testimony is
voluntary or pursuant to a subpoena, two important purposes would be served by
placing all truthful sworn testimony by a public employee pertaining to a matter of
public concern within the ambit of the First Amendment’s protection against
retaliation. First, as made clear by the Third Circuit in Green and by the high Court
in Lane, the integrity of the judicial processand, specifically, the pursuit of truth
in criminal and civil casesremains a paramount societal goal irrespective of
whether a witness’s testimony is compelled by subpoena or voluntary. Second, as
resurrected by the Court in Lane and stressed in this Article, the ability of public
employees to serve as sources of information about corruption and other matters
of public concern is wholly unrelated to whether they testify voluntarily or are
compelled to testify via subpoena and cannot be gainsaid. Both of these important
purposes would be disserved if public employers were allowed to retaliate against
public employees who provide truthful sworn testimony under the happenstance
that their testimony was voluntary, rather than compelled via subpoena.[126]
Thus, all truthful sworn testimony by public employeesand not just testimony
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compelled by subpoenaregarding matters of public concern should generally be
protected under the First Amendment.
However, as most appellate courts have opined, protection of voluntary truthful
sworn testimony should be subject to a Pickering-balancing analysis.[127] Given
the importance of truthful sworn testimony, the Third Circuit in Green,[128] as a
practical matter, made too much of the difference in the public’s interest in
compelled, as opposed to voluntary testimony. After all, for First Amendment
purposes, the public’s interest in sworn testimony depends, not on whether the
testimony is compelled, but rather, whether the testimony is inaccurate or
perjured. That said, a public employer’s interest in effectively and efficiently
delivering the public services concerning which it has been tasked cannot be
ignored. As pointed out in Green and other cases which have struck the balance
against protecting public employees from adverse employment consequences
based on their voluntary testimony, issues of confidentiality, chain of command,
employee discipline and employer image[129]particularly in law enforcement,
but also for other public employersare appropriately factored into the mix when
assessing a public employee’s right to First Amendment protection for testifying
on a matter of public concern. Ultimately, though, as in Kinney and other public
employee-favoring cases,[130] the Pickering-balance should only cede to public
employers when the incursion on their efficiency and effectiveness is grounded in
reasonable, factually-supported prediction or actuality of disruption to the
operation of public employers.
D.

Testimony Whose Content Does Not Involve a Matter of Public
Concern

The Lane Court had little difficulty concluding that both the content and context
of Lane’s speechtruthful testimony at several judicial proceedings concerning
corruption in a state program and misuse of state funds—involved a matter of
public concern protected by the First Amendment under the Pickering/Connick
standard.[131] However, courts of appeals and district courtsboth before and
after Lanehave been sharply divided over whether trial testimony, irrespective
of the content of the testimony, constitutes a matter of public concern protectable
under the First Amendment.
Prior to Lane, the Third and Fifth Circuits took the most expansive view regarding
the question, holding that the sworn form and judicial or formalized context of
testimony made it per se a matter of public concern, even where the content of the
speech involves a purely private matter.[132] At the other end of the spectrum,
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the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits held that sworn testimony in a
judicial or other proceeding will only constitute a matter of public concern where
the content of the speech addresses a matter of public concern (such as a political,
social or other concern to the community).[133] And, between these two doctrinal
poles, the Ninth Circuit has held:
[A] public employee’s testimony addresses a matter of public concern if it contributes in
some way to the resolution of a judicial or administrative proceeding in which
discrimination or other significant government misconduct is at issue—even if the speech
itself would not otherwise meet the Connick test were we to consider it in isolation.[134]

The post-Lane judicial results concerning the testimony/public concern standard
have been equally mixed. One court, although dismissing a public employee’s First
Amendment retaliation claims on other grounds, cited to Third Circuit per se
authority and that portion of the Supreme Court’s holding in Lane focusing on the
judicial context, agreed that the employee’s participation in several law suits
constituted protected speech.[135] Other post-Lane courts, however, have
continued to reject the per se standard and have continued to hold that content
matters.[136] Lastly, as it did pre-Lane, the Ninth Circuit has arguably continued
to apply a middle ground test post-Lane, citing to and quoting its Alpha Energy
decision to the effect that “a public employee’s testimony addresses a matter of
public concern if it contributes in some way to the resolution of a judicial or
administrative proceeding in which discrimination or other significant
government misconduct is at issue.”[137]
Whether public employee testimony whose content does not involve a matter of
public concern should be protected because of the context in which the speech
occurs raises the most difficult unanswered question in Lane. As discussed
previously, Lane emphasized two reasons for protecting public employees from
retaliation for testifying truthfully: first, to protect and promote the truth-seeking
function of the judicial and administrative processes;[138] and second, to ensure
that the public at large has a source of information concerning the operation of a
public employerand, specifically, issues of corruption and other matters of
public concernthat may on occasion only be provided by public employees.[139]
The first purpose relates to context, and the second purpose relates to
content.[140] In Lane, where the public employee testimony concerned corruption
in the public sector workplace,[141] both purposes were served. However, in cases
where the content of the public employee’s testimony does not involve a matter of
public concernsuch as Johnston, where the testimony related to a personnel
issue involving the public employer, and, in Pro, where the plaintiff appeared in a
case, a divorce proceeding, that did not involve the employer’s operations, let alone
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corruption or wrongdoing in the public sector workplace[142] only the purpose
of promoting truthful testimony would be served.
The question then becomes whether service of this latter purpose is sufficient to
protect public employees from retaliation by public employers under the First
Amendment. The answer must be that it does. Stakeholders to judicial and
administrative proceedingsthe public at large, the courts and tribunals, and the
parties to the proceedingsare entitled to truthful testimony in furtherance of the
fact-finding and truth-seeking goals of those proceedings. Likewise, public
employees, irrespective of whether their testimony involves a matter of public
concern about the operation of their employers, should not be placed in the
“impossible position” described by the Court in Lane,[143] i.e., testify falsely and
commit perjury or testify truthfully and lose their job. For these reasons, context
alone under the per se rule described in pre- and post-Lane cases should be
sufficient to cause truthful testimony to be protected under the First Amendment.
E.

False or Erroneous Testimony or Unnecessary Disclosure of
Sensitive, Confidential or Privileged Information

The Lane Court suggested in dicta that the outcome of the case might have been
different under the Pickering-balancing test if “Lane’s testimony at Schmitz’[s]
trials was false or erroneous or that Lane unnecessarily disclosed any sensitive,
confidential, or privileged information while testifying.”[144] No post-Lane cases
have discussed Lane concerning the resolution of these two issues; however, preLane case law and at least one case decided after Lane but not discussing it, have
all properly reached the conclusion that public employee testimony falling into
these two categories would not be protected when assessed under Pickering.
False or Erroneous Testimony

Although the Supreme Court has not resolved whether false statements made
outside of court may constitute protected speech under the First Amendment and
lower courts are divided on the issue,[145] pre-Lane lower courts held that public
employees who testify falsely in a judicial proceedings were not entitled to First
Amendment protection from discharge by public employers.[146] Indeed,
applying the Supreme Court’s decision in Waters v. Churchill,[147] lower courts
prior to Lane held that, where a public employer reasonably, but mistakenly,
believes that a public employee testified falsely, the employer may fire the
employee without offending the First Amendment.[148] Courts largely based these
later decisions concerning false testimony by applying Pickering, increasing the
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weight allocated to the public employer’s interest and reducing the weight
allocated to the public employee’s interest on the Pickering scales:
[I]f an employee has presented false testimony both sides of the Pickering balance may
be significantly altered. As the First Circuit has recognized, “an employer has a greater
interest in curtailing erroneous statements than correct ones, and still a greater interest
in curtailing deliberate falsehoods,” and “[c]orrespondingly, an employee’s interest in
making public statements is heightened according to their veracity.”[149]

Unlike in Lane, where truthful sworn testimony was properly viewed as critical to
both the integrity of the judicial process and society’s interest in protecting sources
of information about matters of public concern,[150] and was subject to essentially
no counterbalancing on the public employer’s side of the Pickering scales, false or
erroneous testimony by a public employee should be allocated essentially no
weighteither absolutely or in the Pickering-balancing process. False or
erroneous testimony debases the judicial truth-seeking process. Likewise, that
same testimony does not furtherand, indeed, may underminesociety’s interest
in learning about and ferreting out corruption in the government workplace. For
these reasons, false or erroneous testimony should not protect a public employee
from retaliation under the First Amendment.
Unnecessary Disclosure of Sensitive, Confidential or Privileged
Information

Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Lane, lower courts applied Pickering to
routinely reject First Amendment retaliation claims by public employees seeking
to challenge discharge or other adverse employment action based on the
employees’ having disclosedalbeit not while testifyingconfidential or sensitive
information held by the public employer.[151] Pre-Lane decisions concerning the
same question in the context of employer retaliation in response to sworn
testimony in judicial proceedings are scarce or nonexistentalthough one court
has suggested that a police bureau’s pre-authorization requirement for officers
wishing to serve as an expert witness might have been saved from First
Amendment infirmity if it had been narrowly tailored to protect a municipality’s
legitimate interest in preventing disclosure of confidential information.[152]
Post-Lane decisions have similarly rejected First Amendment retaliation claims by
public employees who disclosed public employer confidential information in
settings outside of testifying in court.[153]
The government, acting as a public employer, will occasionally have a legitimate
interest in preventing a public employee from testifying truthfully about a matter

FALL 2017

ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT

23

of public concern that will outweigh the employee, the judicial system, and
society’s interest in obtaining truthful testimony from that employee. As discussed
previously, this interest may arise where the government has legitimate
reasonsincluding not compromising the confidentiality of an ongoing operation,
maintaining the safety of public officials and employees, or not otherwise
disrupting sensitive government operationsfor objecting to public disclosure of
law enforcement or national security investigations or operations.[154] As such,
disclosure by public employees of confidential information,[155] although often
preventable by the government by appearing at the proceedings at which the public
employee will testify and objecting to the employee’s testimony regarding
legitimately confidential subjects, may properly cause a public employee to lose
under the Pickering-balancing test. Under those circumstances, and as discussed
below,[156] that legitimate interest will provide an employer with cause for taking
adverse employment action against the employee.
F.

Public Employee Admission of Wrongdoing While Testifying

Toward the close of its opinion, the Lane Court noted that “quite apart from
Pickering balancing, wrongdoing that an employee admits to while testifying may
be a valid basis for termination or other discipline.”[157] Post-Lane, two district
courts have applied the above-quoted “wrongdoing” language, but concluded that
sufficient factual issues existed in each case such that pre-trial motions by public
sector employees could not be granted.[158]
Lane’s “wrongdoing” dicta stems from two, related legal principles. First, it stands
for the proposition that, generally speaking, misconduct by a public employee may
give his or her employer just or good cause to take adverse employment against the
employee.[159] Second, it may relate to the Supreme Court’s causation analysis in
First Amendment retaliation cases set forth in Mount Healthy City School District
Board of Education. v. Doyle,[160] where the Court held that, even if a public
employee has demonstrated that his or her protected speech was a substantial or
motivating factor in his or her termination, a public employer may still avoid
liability by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have
terminated the employee even in the absence of the protected speech.[161]
However, even if a public employer sustains its evidentiary burden on the
causation issue, a public employee’s admission during testimony that he or she
engaged in wrongdoingparticularly when it involves relatively innocuous, albeit
criminal, off-duty conduct or speechshould not lead to adverse employment
action against the employee in every instance.[162] Likewise, a public employer
must adhere to any applicable progressive discipline and/or due process
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requirements when disciplining or discharging a public employee who admits to
wrongdoing while testifying.[163] And, if a public employee has reached an
agreement with his or her employer that the employee’s testimony about the
misconduct will not cause him or her adverse employment consequence, then the
public employer must honor that agreement.[164]
Certainly, if a public employee admits while testifying that he or she engaged in
wrongdoing, and the employee has not received any kind of promise from his or
her employer that the testimony will not be used against his or her continued
employment, that admission may serve as a basis for the public employer to take
adverse employment action against the employee. However, that general
proposition must be limited by principles of causation, nexus of the misconduct to
employment, and progressive discipline and/or due process.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court left unanswered far more questions than it resolved in Lane v.
Franks. The Court, however, by resurrecting and reemphasizing first principles
from Pickering—that public employees should be protected under the First
Amendment from retaliation by their employers because the employees are often
uniquely situated to report on corruption and other matters of public concern in
the public sector workplace—provided the compass by which courts should
navigate the difficult terrain posed by those open questions in the sworn testimony
context. The Court and lower courts should take guidance from Pickering’s
fundamental teachings, as reinvigorated by the Court in Lane.
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conclude that if Myers’ questionnaire cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a
matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge.”).
[54] See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 414-15 (2006).
[55] Id. at 424.
[56] Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2378 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418).
[57] Id. (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421).
[58] Id. at 2378 n.4 (citations omitted).
[59] See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2378.
[60] Id. at 2378.
[61] Id. at 2378-79.
[62] Id.
[63] Id. at 2379 (citations omitted).
[64] See id.
[65] Id.
[66] Id.
[67] Id.
[68] Id. (alteration in original) (citing and quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421
(2006)).
[69] Id. at 2379.
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[70] Id. at 2379-80 (citations omitted) The Court further stated, “[P]ublic employees ‘are
uniquely qualified to comment’ on ‘matters concerning government policies that are of interest
to the public at large.’”Id. at 2380.

[71] See id. at 2380. Of course, Garcetti involved possible corruption by law enforcement officers
learned by a prosecutor during the course of his work, i.e., during the performance of his official duties.
Thus, the very anomaly that the Lane Court decried had already occurred in Garcetti. See id.; see also
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 410.
[72] See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380.
[73] See id.
[74] Id.
[75] See id. (“Applying these principles, it is clear that Lane’s sworn testimony is speech as a

citizen.”).
[76] Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
[77] Id. (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48 (1983)).
[78] Id. (citing and quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425 (2006)) (“Exposing governmental
inefficiency and misconduct is a matter of considerable significance.”).
[79] See id.
[80] Id. (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2546 (2012) (plurality opinion)).
[81] Id. at 2380.
[82] See id. at 2373-77.
[83] See id. at 2377.
[84] Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380 (quoting and citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at418 (2006)).
[85] Id. at 2381 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting and citing
Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-51 (1983)).
[86] Id. at 2381. The Court also noted that “quite apart from Pickering balancing, wrongdoing
that an employee admits to while testifying may be a valid basis for termination or other
discipline.” Id. at 2381 n.5; see infra note 157 and accompanying text.
[87] See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2376-77. Although Lane was the proverbial “easy case” as far as
Supreme Court cases go, the Court held that Franks was entitled to qualified immunity because
Lane’s First Amendment rights were not clearly established, and the question concerning those
rights were not “beyond debate” at the time Franks terminated Lane’s employment. Id. at 2376,
2383.
[88] Id. at 2383-84.
[89] Id. at 2383 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418); see also id. at 2374, 2378; Connick, 461 U.S.
at 143; cf. supra note 58 and accompanying text.
[90] Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2384 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
[91] Id. (citations omitted).
[92] See id.; see also Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
[93] Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. In his Garcetti dissent, Justice Breyer twice used the term
“ordinary” as it pertained to job duties. Id. at 444, 449-50.
[94] Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2375, 2377-79, 2381, 2383-84; see also Mpoy v. Rhee, 758 F.3d 285, 294-95
(D.C. Cir. 2014).
[95] See Trustees v. Sons, 27 Ill. 2d 63, 66, 187 N.E.2d 673, 674 (1963) (opining that where

change in statutory language occurred inadvertently, legislature did not intend to change
meaning of statute).
[96] See, e.g., Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 974 n.14 (11th Cir. 2008) (where the Supreme
Court used different language in a Title VII retaliation case than in a Title VII discrimination
case, the legal standard in each case was held to be different); State v. Parks, 866 So.2d 172, 174
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(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“[W]hen the legislature amends a statute by omitting or including
words, it is to be presumed that the legislature intended the statute to have a different meaning
than that accorded it before the amendment.”); United States v. Brewer, 9 M.J. 509, 512 (A.F.
Ct. M. R. 1980) (where a court used different language than previously, new terminology would
be held to change the legal standard).
[97] See Dibrito v. City of St. Joseph, 675 F. App’x 593, 596(6th Cir. 2017); Mpoy, 758 F.3d at
295; Lynch v. Ackley, 811 F.3d 569, 582 n.13 (2d Cir. 2016); , 804 F.3d 1149, 1163 (11th Cir.
2015); Boulton v. Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 534 (6th Cir. 2015); Gibson v. Kirkpatrick, 773 F.3d
661, 668 (5th Cir. 2014); see also Hagan v. City of New York, 39 F. Supp. 3d 481, 510 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (emphasis in original) (“[T]he question is not whether an employee’s speech is made
pursuant to any official duty, but whether it is made pursuant to one of his ordinary official
duties.”); but cf. Brown v. Office of State Comptroller, 211 F. Supp. 3d 455, 464 n.3 (D. Conn.
2016) (Hagan’s “interpretation of Lane is too broad.”).
[98] See Flora v. Cty. of Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169, 179 (3d Cir. 2015) (declining to reach the
question of “whether Lane modified or merely clarified Garcetti” in terms of the official duties
standard.
[99] Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 772 F.3d 979, 990 (3d Cir. 2014) (emphasis
added). Inexplicably, the Third Circuit quotes the D.C. Circuit’s above-quoted statement in Mpoy
concerning Lane’s narrowing the Garcetti official duties standard as support for its statement in
Dougherty. Flora, 776 F.3d at 178 (quoting Mpoy, 758 F.3d at 294-95).
[100] See Heffernan v. City of Patterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1414 (2016) (holding that fact that
supervisor’s mistaken that the employee was involved in the mayoral campaign was mistaken
did not bar a First Amendment retaliation claim by the officer).
[101] See Lefebrve v. Morgan, No. 14-CV-5322 (KMK), 2016 WL 1274584, at *10 n.12 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 31, 2016) (where public employee’s speech “was related to the heart of his job
responsibilities,” any possible distinction between Garcetti and Lane standards did not affect
the court’s analysis); Cory v. City of Basehor, 631 F. App’x. 526, 529 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Mr. Cory’s
reports did not merely ‘concern’ his duties, but were made ‘within the scope’ of his duties as a
police officer.”); Gibson, 773 F.3d 661 at 668-69 (not reaching the question of whether Lane
altered Garcetti, since a “clearly established” standard for qualified immunity dictated the result
in favor of the individual defendant); Mpoy, 758 F.3d at 295-96 (likewise not reaching the
question after concluding defendants were entitled to qualified immunity).
[102] See Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 408 n.24 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he Supreme Court
in recent years has made it clear that the First Amendment has a broad reach, limited only by
narrow, traditional carve-outs from its protection.”).
[103] See Crystal v. Barrett, No. JKB-14-3989, 2015 WL 5698534, at *7 (D. Md. Sept. 25, 2015)
(noting that Lane left open the question of whether testimony pursuant to a public employee’s
ordinary job responsibilities constitutes protected speech and leaving the question open itself at
an early stage in the proceedings).
[104] Rule 30(b)(6), Fed. R.Civ. P. provides in pertinent part:
In its notice or subpoena, a party may name as the deponent a public or private corporation, a partnership,
an association, a governmental agency, or other entity and must describe with reasonable particularity the
matters for examination. The named organization must then designate one or more officers, directors, or
managing agents, or designate other persons who consent to testify on its behalf; and it may set out the
matters on which each person designated will testify . . . . The persons designated must testify about
information known or reasonably available to the organization.

[105] The closest a court has come to directly addressing the question expressly left open in
Lane was in Rayborn v. Bossier Par. Sch. Sys., 198 F. Supp. 3d 747 (W.D. La. 2016). In Rayborn,
a public school nurse alleged that school officials retaliated against her when, among other
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things, she turned over her notes concerning a student in response to a subpoena. Id. at 758-59.
Focusing on the fact that the nurse’s official duties included maintaining records concerning her
nursing activities, the district court was “not persuaded” by the nurse’s attempt, based on the
notes having been subpoenaed, “to analogize their constitutional status to that of the testimony
protected in Lane.” Id. at 759. In rejecting the nurse’s First Amendment claim, the court was
unclear on whether it was distinguishing her subpoenaed notes from Lane’s trial testimony or,
instead, was deciding the open question in Lane in favor of the public employer. Clarity
eventually may be obtained on this issue, since, as of this writing, Rayborn is pending on appeal
to the Fifth Circuit.
[106] 532 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2008).
[107] Id. at 231.
[108] 574 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 2009).
[109] 526 F.3d 1074 (7th Cir. 2008).
[110] Huppert, 574 F.3d at 707-08; Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1092.
[111] Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379 (citations omitted); see also supra note 89.
[112] See id. at 2379-80.
[113] Id at 2380; see supra note 72 and accompanying text.
[114] For this reason, and although testifying as a Rule 30(b)(6) representative of an employer
might be considered, to paraphrase Justice Sotomayor in Lane, quintessential speech as an
employee, the above-discussed dilemmathe importance of truthful sworn testimony to the
judicial and administrative process and society’s need for information about matters of public
concernall militate in favor of protecting public employees from retaliation even when their
testimony is pursuant to a Rule 30(b)(6) designation.
[115] See Joseph Deloney, Note, Protecting Public Employee Trial Testimony, 91 CHI. KENT L.
REV. 709, 734 (2016) (“If an employee discloses confidential information, although truthful, the
government could take action without violating that employee’s First Amendment rights.”).
[116] See Lemay Diaz, Comment, Truthful Testimony as the “Quintessential Example of Speech
as a Citizen”: Why Lane v. Franks Lays the Groundwork for Protecting Public Employee
Truthful Testimony, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 565, 595 (2016) (“Perhaps in some rare
circumstance, such as in the realm of national security, the government in its role as an employer
may articulate an important government interest requiring utmost confidentiality. And under
such circumstances, the government employer may truly possess a strong managerial
discretionary interest in curtailing the public employee’s speech.”).
[117] Deloney, supra note 115, at 719.
[118] Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2381.
[119] Two post-Lane cases have addressed voluntary, as opposed to compelled, statements, but
neither case discussed whether voluntary testimony would receive the same First Amendment
protection from retaliation as the subpoenaed testimony in Lane. Neither case is on point on
the “voluntary vs. compelled testimony” question. See Helget v. City of Hays, No. 13-2228-KHV,
2015 WL 1263118, at *11 (D. Kan. Mar. 19, 2015) (factual showing that a voluntary sworn affidavit
caused the court to assume, without deciding, that plaintiff’s speech was a matter of public
concern), aff’d on other grounds, 844 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2017); see also Wagner v. Lee Cty.,
Fla. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, No. 2:14-cv-29-FTM-38CM, 2014 WL 4145500, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug.
21, 2014) (explaining that this case differs from Lane in that the statements involved voluntary
internal statements, not judicial testimony).
[120] Kaluczky v. City of White Plains, 57 F.3d 202, 210 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted);
accord Caruso v. City of New York, 973 F. Supp. 2d 430, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Jackler v. Byrne,
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658 F.3d 225, 239 (2d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); Frisenda v. Inc. Vill. of Malverne, 775 F.
Supp. 2d 486, 510 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
[121] Green v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 105 F.3d 882, 886-89 (3d Cir. 1997); accord Kinney
v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 361-62, 362 n.28 (5th Cir. 2004) (expert witnesses received subpoenas,
but testified voluntarily); see also Worrell v. Henry, 219 F.3d 1197, 1201, 1204-05 (10th Cir.
2000) (expert witness for criminal defendant); Tedder v. Norman, 167 F.3d 1213, 1214-15 (8th
Cir. 1999) (voluntary deposition testimony). The Third Circuit in Green did not terminate its
analysis by concluding that voluntary testimony was invariably protected under the First
Amendment; rather, the court of appeals in Greenand the courts of appeals in the other cases
cited abovewent on to analyze whether the speech was protected under the Pickeringbalancing test. See Green, 105 F.3d at 887-89; see also Kinney, 367 F.3d at 358-67; Worrell, 19
F.3d at 1205-09; Tedder, 167 F.3d at 1214-15. This aspect of the analysis will be taken up at Part
III.C.2.
[122] Kiehle v. County of Cortland, 486 F. App’x 222, 224 (2d Cir. 2012).
[123] See Green, 105 F.3d at 887-89; see also Kinney, 367 F.3d at 358-67, 362 n.28; Worrell,
219 F.3d at 1201, 1204-09; Tedder, 167 F.3d at 1214-15.
[124] Green, 105 F.3d at 888-89 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). There are several
similar decisions. See, e.g., Tedder, 167 F.3d at 1215 (where voluntary testimony substantially
undermined the relationship between the plaintiff and his supervisor, the supervisor reasonably
believed that the testimony was provided in violation of agency policy, and testimony could
disrupt the employer's relationships with other law enforcement agencies, holding the testimony
unprotected under Pickering.); Worrell, 219 F.3d at 1208-09 (where drug agents with whom
applicant for drug task force coordinator would have had to work with had indicated they did
not trust applicant because he had testified for a defendant in a murder trial, the potential for
extreme disruption of task force's functioning existed).
[125] Kinney, 367 F.3d at 374; accord Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706, 714 (10th
Cir. 1989) (finding that where a police officer voluntarily testified for a judge who was a criminal
defendant, the public interest in truthful testimony outweighed the public entities’ interest in
confidentiality or possible disruption under Pickering); Minten v. Weber, 832 F. Supp. 2d 1007,
1020-24 (N.D. Iowa 2011) (holding that where a police officer offered to voluntarily testify
against a sheriff in a civil suit brought by plaintiffs alleging that denial of their applications for
concealed weapon permits violated their First Amendment rights, the public’s interest in
encouraging testimony disclosing misconduct by the sheriff outweighed the police department’s
interest in operational efficiency and harmony.); Lynch v. City of Philadelphia, 166 F. Supp. 2d
224, 229-31 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (distinguishing Green, and where, assuming police officer
voluntarily testified at subordinate officers’ criminal trials, plaintiff’s (and public’s) interest in
truthful testimony was not outweighed by minimal disruption caused to police department’s
operations).
[126] As pointed out by one commentator, “many witnesses are compelled by subpoena
arbitrarily,” since “[a]ttorneys ‘issue subpoenas to witnesses who would have voluntarily
attended even absent a subpoena.’” Deloney, supra note 115 at 732 n.207 (quoting Brief for Am.
Civil Liberties Union & the Am. Civil Liberties Union of Alabama as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 13, Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014) (No. 13-483)). Another commentator has
pointed out that “if a subpoena is required for the testifying employee to maintain his First
Amendment rights, the testifying employee will always refuse to testify unless subpoenaed.”
Matt Wolfe, Comment, Does the First Amendment Protect Testimony by Public Employees?, 77
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U. CHI. L. REV. 1473, 1500 (2010). In sum, the furtherance of important First Amendment
purposes and protections should not turn on such arbitrary practical matters and distinctions.
[127] See Kinney, 367 F.3d at 382 (Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
Green, 105 F.3d at 887.
[128] See Green, 105 F.3d at 886, 888.
[129] Id. at 889-90; see also Kinney, 367 F.3d at 396-97, 398 (Jones, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
[130] See Kinney, 367 F.3d at 367; Tedder v. Norman, 167 F.3d 1213, 1214-15 (8th Cir. 1999);
Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706, 714 (10th Cir. 1989).
[131] Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380-81.
[132] See Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1288 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); Johnston v.
Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1578 (5th Cir. 1989).
[133] See Arvinger v. Mayor and City of Baltimore, 862 F.2d 75, 79 (4th Cir. 1988); Wright v.
Ill.s Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 40 F.3d 1492, 1505 (7th Cir. 1994); Padilla v. SouthHarrison R-II Sch. Dist., 181 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted); Morris v. Crow,
142 F.3d 1379, 1382-83 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
[134] Alpha Energy Savers, Inc. v. Hansen, 381 F.3d 917, 927 (9th Cir. 2004).
[135] Falco v. Zimmer, No. 13-1648, 2015 WL 7069653, at ** 1-3 and 8 (citations omitted); see
also Helget v. City of Hays, Kansas No. 13-2228-KHV, 2015 WL 1263118, at *11 (D. Kan. Mar.
19, 2015) (noting pre-Lane split in the case law, but, under Lane, even though “standing in
isolation, the content of plaintiff's speech may not have raised a matter of public concern,”
district court assumed, but did not decide, that speech in sworn affidavit in co-worker’s civil case
was a matter of public concern).
[136] Moriates v. City of New York, No. 13-CV-4845 (ENV) (LB), 2016 WL 3566656, at **1-2
and 5 (E.D.N.Y. June 15, 2016) (citations omitted); see also Meza v. Douglas Cty. Fire Dist., No.
2:15-CV-115-RMP, 2016 WL 3746568, at *4 (E.D. Wash. July 8, 2016) (finding that firefighter
could not prove that his testimony in an arbitration over a coworker’s termination involved a
matter of public concern where firefighter could not recall the specifics of his testimony).
[137] Stillwell v. City of Williams, 831 F.3d 1234, 1239 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Alpha Energy
Savers Inc. v. Hansen, 381 F.3d 917, 927 (9th Cir. 2004)).
[138] See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379.
[139] See id. at 2379-80.
[140] See id. at 2381 (The circumstances under which the speech is uttered relates to context,
whereas the information contained in the speech relates to its content).
[141] See id. at 2380-81.
[142] See Johnston v. Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565 (5th Cir. 1989); Pro v.
Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283 (3d Cir. 1996).
[143] Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2381.
[144] Id.
[145] In Pickering, the Supreme Court stated that “we have no occasion to pass upon the
additional question whether a statement that was knowingly or recklessly false would, if it were
neither shown nor could reasonably be presumed to have had any harmful effects, still be
protected by the First Amendment.” Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574 n.6 (citation omitted). Although
the Court has stated in dicta that “an employee’s false criticism of his employer on grounds not
of public concern may be cause for his discharge,” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (2008),
the question left open in Pickering concerning false statements about matters of public concern
“has yet to arise in a government-employee retaliation case before the Supreme Court.”
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Spacecon Specialty Contractors, LLC v. Bensinger, 713 F.3d 1028, 1052-53 (10th Cir. 2013)
(Hartz, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Lacking Supreme Court guidance, lower courts have
split on the issue. Some courts have held that false statements are per se unprotected under the
First Amendment. See, e.g., Westmoreland v. Sutherland, 662 F.3d 714, 721 (6th Cir. 2011)
(citations omitted) (“Pickering balancing is not required if it is determined that the employee
made statements with knowledge of, or reckless indifference to, their falsity.”); Brenner v.
Brown, 36 F.3d 18, 20 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Any adverse employment action suffered by plaintiff was
not the result of any protected speech; instead, it was a reasonable response by her employer to
outrageous and unsupported defamatory remarks.”). In contrast, other courts have rejected a
per se approach, holding that false statements should be analyzed under the Pickering-balancing
test. See, e.g., Johnson v. Multnomah Cty., Oregon, 48 F.3d 420, 424 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he
recklessness of the employee and the falseness of the statements should be considered in light of
the public employer’s showing of actual injury to its legitimate interests, as part of the Pickering
balancing test.”); Brasslett v. Cota, 761 F.2d 827, 840 (1st Cir. 1985) (examining “pertinent
interest to be weighed” concerning the speech).
[146] See Gilchrist v. Citty, 173 F. App’x 675, 684-85 (10th Cir. 2006); Lynch v. City of
Philadelphia, 166 F. Supp. 2d 224, 230 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (finding that where “no indication that
[police officer] testified falsely or in a manner which would undermine” the police department,
there was a genuine issue of material fact whether the speech was protected under the Pickeringbalancing test).
[147] 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
[148] See Swetlik v. Crawford, 738 F.3d 818, 828 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted); Wright v.
Ill. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 40 F.3d 1492, 1506 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); see
also Waters, 511 U.S. at 685 (Souter, J., concurring) (asserting that the reasonableness test in
the plurality opinion was approved by a majority of the Court and, therefore, constitutes a
holding).
[149] Wright, 40 F.3d at 1505 (quoting O’Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 916 n.8 (1st Cir.
1993)).
[150] Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379-80.
[151] See, e.g., Orange v. Dist. of Columbia, 59 F.3d 1267, 1272-73 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that
although university administrator’s “disclosure of … questionable billing practices . . . involved
a ‘matter of public concern’ . . . the government’s interest in protecting the integrity of its
[ongoing] investigation into fraud clearly outweighed whatever interest [the administrator] had
in disclosing confidential information.”); see also Signore v. City of Montgomery, Ala., 354 F.
Supp. 2d 1290, 1295-97 (M.D. Ala. 2005) (in a case involving a police department employee’s
disclosure of theft of a department vehicle to a newspaper reporter, the employee’s speech was
not entitled to protection under the First Amendment since his interest was outweighed by the
city’s interest in ensuring efficient investigations by preserving, as confidential, details of a
vehicle theft while the criminal investigation, and possibly internal affairs investigation, were
ongoing); Barnhill v. Bd. of Regents of UW Sys., 479 N.W.2d 917, 926-28 (Wis. 1992) (reaching
the same result as Signore, where a public university employee disclosed confidential survey
results to a reporter).
[152] See Swartzwelder v. McNeilly, 297 F.3d 228, 239 (3d Cir. 2002).
[153] See Delano v. City of Buffalo, 45 F. Supp. 3d 297, 308, 310 (W.D.N.Y. 2014); Collins v.
Gusman, No. 14–234, 2015 WL 1468298, at *6 (E.D. La. Mar. 30, 2015).
[154] See Diaz, supra note 116, at 595.
[155] See, 134 S. Ct. at 2381.
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[156] See infra Part III.F.
[157] Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2381 n.5. One judge, discussing Lane, has stated, “[a]lthough the act
of testifying is protected, the testimony itself is not privileged.” See Avila v. Los Angeles Police
Dept., 758 F.3d 1096, 1106 (9th Cir. 2014) (Vinson, J., dissenting).
[158] Calpin v. Lackawanna Cty., No. 3:16-2013, 2017 WL 590277 (M.D. Pa. 2017); Lumpkin
v. Aransas Cty., Texas. No. 2:15-CV-190, 2016 WL 7734607, at *7 (S.D. Tex. 2016).
[159] See, e.g., Lujan v. City of Santa Fe, 89 F. Supp. 3d 1109, 1158-59 (D.N.M. 2015) (citing
Selmeczki v. New Mexico Dep’t of Corr., 129 P.3d 158, 163 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006)); Woods v. City
of Berwyn, 2014 Ill. App. (1st) 133450 at ¶¶ 42-43, 20 N.E.3d 808, 816 (Ill. Ct. App. 2014).
[160] 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977).
[161] Id. at 287; see also Rivers v. New York City Hous. Auth., 176 F. Supp. 3d 229, 245
(E.D.N.Y. 2016) (collecting cases on issue of whether the longstanding Mt. Healthy “substantial
motivating factor” or recently-articulated Title VII “but-for” causation test applies to First
Amendment retaliation claims).
[162] See John E. Rumel, Beyond Nexus: A Framework for Evaluating K-12 Teacher Off-Duty
Conduct and Speech in Adverse Employment or Licensure Proceedings, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 685,
705 (2015).
[163] See In re Stallworth, 26 A.3d 1059, 1061, 1067, 1070 (N.J. 2011) (progressive discipline);
see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) (due process).
[164] See United States v. Anderson, 450 A.2d 446, 449 n.1 (D.C. Ct. A. 1982) (citing Garrity
v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967)). This type of agreement would be akin to a “Reverse Garrity”
warning, albeit in the public employment setting. A Reverse Garrity warning “informs the
employee that while a refusal to testify might have disciplinary or employment consequences,
neither the statement itself, nor fruits of the statement will be used against him in any criminal
proceedings.” Id.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
By Student Editorial Board:
Nicolas Carrizales Coronado, Ning Ding, Yuting Li,
and Jeremiah Shavers
Recent Developments is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee
Relations Report. It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the public
employment relations community. This issue focuses on developments under the
public employee collective bargaining statutes.
I. IELRA DEVELOPMENTS
A. Arbitration

In City Colleges Contingent Labor Organizing Committee and City Colleges of
Chicago, 34 PERI ¶ 24 (IELRB July 20, 2017), the IELRB held that an arbitration
award was not binding because the procedures through which it was issued were
fundamentally unfair. The City Colleges adopted a policy to avoid penalties due to
re-employment of retirees. The union grieved the policy and the matter proceeded
to arbitration. At the conclusion of the arbitration hearing, the union asked to
make a closing oral argument and the employer asked to file a written brief. The
arbitrator granted both requests.
Fifteen days prior to the deadline for the employer to file its brief, the arbitrator
issued an award in which he noted that both parties had made oral closing
arguments in lieu of filing briefs. The arbitrator sustained the grievance in part.
The City Colleges’ representative in the arbitration emailed the union’s
representative expressing concern that the arbitrator had issued the award before
the deadline for the employer’s brief. The union representative emailed the
arbitrator and the City Colleges representative stating that the union had no
objection to the arbitrator reopening the award to allow the arbitrator to consider
the employer’s brief. The arbitrator acknowledged his error and offered to convert
his award to a draft and consider the employer’s brief before issuing a final award.
The employer objected and, at the request of the union, the arbitrator reissued his
award as a final award. The employer refused to comply with the award.
The IELRB held that the award was not binding because of the fundamental
unfairness resulting from the arbitrator’s issuance of the award without waiting for
and considering the employer’s brief. The IELRB reasoned that the arbitrator’s
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error precluded the City Colleges from presenting its arguments before the
arbitrator issued his award. The IELRB held that the arbitrator’s offer to reopen
the award did not cure the error because such a process could not ensure that the
arbitrator would be able to ignore his initial ruling and give the matter a fresh
consideration. Consequently, the IELRB concluded that City Colleges did not
violate section 14(a)(8) of the IELRA by refusing to comply with the award.
B.

Duty to Bargain

In AFSCME Council 31 and Northern Illinois University, 34 PERI ¶ 61 (IELRB
Sept. 14, 2017), the IELRB held that Northern Illinois University violated section
14(a)(5) and (1) of the IELRA when it increased staff parking fees while
negotiations with AFSCME for a first contract were going on. AFSCME had been
certified as exclusive representative of a unit of clerical para-professional, technical
and administrative employees. While negotiations for a first contract were ongoing, the university announced an increase in fees for staff parking permits to take
effect two months later. The union demanded to bargain and the parties agreed to
discuss parking fees during their next regularly scheduled bargaining session.
About a month following the announcement, new parking permits went on sale
and at least one bargaining unit member paid the higher fee. The union demanded
that the university rescind the fee increase as to the bargaining unit and reimburse
any members who had already paid the higher fee. The university asked the union
for any proposals it had on the matter. The union stated that discussion would be
pointless until the status quo was reestablished.
The IELRB held that by unilaterally increasing parking fees, a mandatory subject
of bargaining, the university breached its duty to bargain. The IELRB rejected the
university’s argument that the status quo with respect to parking fees included
periodic fee increases. The IELRB observed that the university had increased
parking fees in 2005, 2006, 2008 and 2011. It concluded that there was no regular
pattern of increasing parking fees, which had not been increased for several years
before the onset of bargaining and thus fee increases were not part of the status
quo. The IELRB ordered the university to rescind the fee increase for bargaining
unit members, make unit members whole and refrain from increasing parking fees
without bargaining with the union.
C.

Representation Proceedings

In University of Illinois and Illinois Federation of Public Employees, Local 4408,
and Metropolitan Alliance of Police Chapter 738, 34 PERI ¶ 71 (IELRB Aug. 21,
2017), the IELRB held that a grant of a unit clarification petition does not trigger a
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one-year certification bar to the filing of a representation petition. The university
created the position of security officer and the Metropolitan Alliance of Police
(MAP) filed a majority interest petition. The university opposed the petition
arguing that a bargaining unit limited to security officers was not appropriate. The
Illinois Federation of Public Employees (IFPE) filed a unit clarification position
seeking to include the security officers in a unit of security guards that IFPE had
historically represented. MAP withdrew its majority interest petition and filed a
representation petition for a combined unit of security guards and security officers.
The Executive Director granted the unit clarification petition, found that the
security officers should be included in the security guards unit and ordered an
election to determine the employees’ choice of bargaining representative. IFPE
filed exceptions to the Executive Director’s order of the representation election,
arguing that the unit clarification should have triggered a one-year certification bar
to any representation petition.
The IELRB rejected IFPE’s argument. The IERLB reasoned that a unit clarification
petition is granted only where the positions added to the unit are so similar to the
positions already in the unit that no election or majority interest proceeding is
necessary to determine the desires of the employees in the new positions. In such
circumstances, the bargaining representative does not need a year free from
representation petitions to bargain on behalf of the newly added positions.
Consequently, the IELRB affirmed the Executive Director’s order and remanded
for further proceedings.
II. IPRLA DEVELOPMENTS
A.

Bargaining Units

In Teamsters Local 700 and Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, 34 PERI ¶ 41
(ILRB State Panel June 13, 2017), the ILRB State Panel reversed an Administrative
Law Judge’s decision granting a majority interest petition and held that a hearing
was necessary to determine whether a bargaining unit of Intelligent
Transportation System Field Technicians (ITS) was appropriate. The State Panel
observed that where an employer has an established centralized personnel system
if a unit limited to a portion of employees in the same job classifications or a
portion of employees performing similar duties is presumed inappropriate. The
ILRB observed that in the proceeding before the ALJ, the employer identified
positions that were not already represented by an exclusive bargaining
representative and that were similar to the ITS technicians that the union sought
to represent. The ILRB held that the employer raised an issue of law or fact
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concerning the application of the presumption of inappropriateness that required
an evidentiary hearing and remanded to the ALJ to conduct such a hearing.
B.

Scope of Bargaining

In State of Illinois, Department of Central Management Services and Troopers
Lodge 41, Fraternal Order of Police, ILRB Case No. S-CB-16-023 (ILRB State
Panel July 11, 2017), the ILRB State Panel held that health insurance premiums,
deductibles, co-pays and out of pocket maximums are mandatory subjects of
bargaining and the union did not commit an unfair labor practice when it
submitted those issues to interest arbitration. The ILRB rejected the State’s
arguments that the State Employees Group Insurance Act, 5 ILCS 375, exempted
these matters from bargaining. The State Panel observed that in 2004, section
15(a) of the IPLRA was amended to provide that the IPLRA controls in case of
conflict with any other law “other than Section 5 of the State Employees Group
Health Insurance Act.” The State Panel reasoned that section 5 of the Group Health
Insurance Act provides that contracts for health insurance are subject to
appropriations and to the Illinois Procurement Code and requires the Director of
Central Management Services to report to the Commission on Government
Forecasting and Accountability on issues related to health insurance and
procurement. The ILRB found it significant that the IPLRA exempts from its
control over conflicting laws only Section 5 of the Group Health Insurance Act, not
the entire Group Health Insurance Act. The ILRB reasoned that if the legislature
had intended to preempt bargaining over health insurance entirely, it would have
expressly so stated.
The State Panel also rejected State arguments that health insurance is specifically
provided for in the Group Health Insurance Act and is therefore exempt from
bargaining under section 7 of the IPLRA. The ILRB reasoned that the Group
Insurance Act does not set premiums, deductibles, co-payments or out of pocket
maximums and does not preclude collective bargaining.
The State Panel applied the three-part general test for determining whether a
matter is a mandatory subject of bargaining established in Central City Education
Ass’n v. IELRB, 149 Ill.2d 496, 599 N.E.2d 892 (1992). The ILRB held that health
insurance unequivocally affected wages, hours and terms and conditions of
employment. Because health insurance affects the State’s budget, the ILRB
reasoned, it does raise an issue of inherent managerial authority, but the ILRB
concluded that the benefits of bargaining with respect to premiums, deductibles,
co-payments and out of pocket maximums outweighed the burdens on managerial
authority. On the other hand, the State Panel reasoned, choice of vendor and
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procurement of health care do not bear on wages, hours and terms and conditions
of employment and, therefore, are permissive subjects of bargaining.
Member Snyder concurred in part and dissented in part. He would have held that
premiums are a mandatory subject of bargaining but that deductibles, copayments and out of pocket maximums are part of plan design that is a permissive
subject. In his view, the State was obligated to present the union with a specific
plan design and then bargain over premiums for that design.

